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1.

INTRODUCTION

On August 14, 2012, a three-judge panel of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit issued its decision in United States v. Dinkins.I
Applying the "Cherry doctrine,"2 the Fourth Circuit held that an unavailable
witness's hearsay statements were admissible against a defendant, even though
the defendant did not participate in the wrongdoing that caused the witness's
death, when the murder of the witness by the defendant's co-conspirators had
been in furtherance of a conspiracy in which the defendant was involved and was
reasonably foreseeable to the defendant.
Dinkins ostensibly affirmed the continued viability of the Cherry doctrine in
the aftermath of the 2008 United States Supreme Court decision Giles v.
California,4 which held that the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception to the
hearsay requirement applied only when the defendant engaged in conduct that
was intended to, and did, render a witness unavailable to testify.5 Yet, as
Dinkins correctly, albeit implicitly, acknowledged, Giles's requirement of intent
fundamentally circumscribed the applicability of the Cherry doctrine. Within
the factual context of Dinkins, the Fourth Circuit reached the correct decision.
Yet, in comparatively more ambiguous factual scenarios, Giles will undeniably
require evidence that a defendant possessed the requisite intent to render a
witness unavailable where the government seeks the admission of hearsay
evidence under the Cherry doctrine.

"Associate, Gerald A. Stein, P.C. J.D., cim laude, Temple University Beasley School of Law,
2008. The author would like to thank Professor Emeritus Michael E. Libonati: Professors Louis M.
Natali, Edward D. Ohibaum, and James A. Strazzella (Temple University Beasley School of Law);
as well as the Honorable Joseph J. O'Neill (Philadelphia Municipal Court) for their kind support.
1. 691 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 2012). The Honorable Barbara Milano Keenan authored the
opinion. Id. at 362. The other panel judges, the Honorable Dennis W. Shedd and the Honorable
Henry F. Floyd, joined in the opinion. Id.
2.
See generally United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 820 (10th Cir. 2000) (providing the
principles of a now common rule).
3.
See id. at 386. The Dinkins court also addressed other issues that the defendants had
raised on appeal, including a Batson challenge, see id at 379-81 (citations omitted), and the trial
court's use of an anonymous jury, see id. at 369-79 (citations omitted).
4.
554 U.S. 353 (2008).
5.
See id. at 359-60; see also Dinkins, 691 F.3d at 383 (quoting Giles, 554 U.S. at 359)
(discussing the Supreme Court's decision). Notably, the Fourth Circuit, through its decision in
Dinkins, is the first federal circuit court to substantively discuss whether the Cherry doctrine has
survived Giles. See generally Adrienne Rose, Note, Forfeiture of ConfrontationRights Post-Giles:
f4hethe r a Co-ConspiratorsMisconduct Can Forfeit a Defendant's Right to Confont Witnesses,
14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POLY 281, 300 (2011) ("While nunerous circuits and state courts have
relied on the Cherry doctrine to impute a conspiratorial waiver by misconduct, there has been
astoundingly little scholarship on the Giles holding's effect on the Cherry doctrine.").
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OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT PRIOR LAW

The following general principles provide a necessary context for the Fourth
Circuit's decision in Dinkins.
4. Forfeiture-by-TW rongdoing Exception
Under the general proscription on hearsay evidence, a declarant's out-ofcourt statements may not be admitted to "prove the truth of the matters
asserted."6 Yet, inder Rule 804(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a
statement "offered against a party that wrongfully caused-or acquiesced in
wrongfully causing-the declarant's unavailability as a witness, and did so
intending that result" is "not excluded by the rule against hearsay if the declarant
is unavailable as a witness." Forfeiture by wrongdoing is a well-established
common law exception to the hearsay rule. The exception "recognizes the need
for a prophylactic rule to deal with abhorrent behavior 'which strikes at the heart
of the system of justice itself.'
Although every federal circuit "that has resolved the question has recognized
the principle of forfeiture by misconduct," the tests for determining admissibility
have differed. 10 In the Fourth Circuit, the court must find "by the preponderance
of the evidence that (1) the defendant engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing (2)
that was intended to render the declarant unavailable as a witness and (3) that
11
[the wrongdoing] did, in fact, render the declarant unavailable as a witness."
B. Sixth Amendment
Under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with

the witnesses against him."1
The confrontation requirement of the Sixth
Amendment prohibits the use of testimonial hearsay against a criminal
defendant, even if such hearsay is reliable, unless the defendant had the

6.
United States v. Gray, 405 F.3d 227, 240 (4th Cir. 2005); see also FED. R. EVID. 801
(defining hearsay); FED. R. EvID. 802 (instructing that unless subject to exception, hearsay is
generally inadmissible).
7.
FED R. EVID. 804(b)(6).
8.
See generally Giles, 554 U.S. at 359-64 (providing the history of the forfeiture-bywrongdoing exception and examples of cases interpreting the exception).
9.
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) advisory committee's note to 1997 amendment (quoting United
States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982)).
10. Id.
11. Gray.405F.3dat241.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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opportunity to cross-examine the out-of-court declarant.1 Testimonial hearsay
includes "statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for
use at a later trial."1 4 As the Supreme Court has instructed, although a
declarant's out-of-court statement may satisfy the admissibility requirements of a
hearsay exception, the statement is inadmissible where the statement is
testimonial and no prior opportunity Jbr cross examination of the declarant
occurred.'
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has instructed that where a witness is
unavailable due to forfeiture by wrongdoing, "the rule of forfeiture by
wrongdoing ... extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable
grounds."
As the Court noted in Davis v. WJashington, "one who obtains the
absence of a witness by wrongdoing forfeits the constitutional right to
confrontation." 8 Critically, however, in its 2008 decision Giles v. California,
the Court clarified that the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception to the
confrontation requirement applied only where the defendant engaged in conduct
that was intended to, and did, procure the declarant's absence so that he was
unable to testify as a witness.20 The Giles Court instructed that intent is
necessary as a matter of both (1) a correct interpretation of Rule 804(b)(6) and
(2) the defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation rights.21
C. Conspiracy Theory ofLiability
Under general principles of conspiratorial liability, a person is "liable for
substantive offenses committed by a co-conspirator when their commission is
reasonably foreseeable and in furtherance of the conspiracy."
As the Supreme
Court instructed in Pinkerton v. United States, conspiratorial liability does not

13. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004); see also Giles. 554 U.S. at 358
(citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68) ("[1]f the witness is unavailable, his prior testimony will be
introduced only if the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine him.").
14. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 (quoting Motion for Leave to File Brief of Amici Curiae and
Brief of Amici Curiae the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, The American Civil
Liberties Union and the ACLU of Washington in Support of Petitioner at 3, Craiford,541 U.S. 36
(No. 02-9410), 2003 WL 21754961, at *3) (internal quotation marks omitted).
15. See id. at 68.
16. Id. at 62.
17. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
18. Id. at 833.
19. 554 U.S. 353 (2008).
20. See id at 359 60.
21. See id at 367-68 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) (2010) (restyled 2011); Davis, 547
U.S. at 833: 5 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE

§ 8:134,

at 235 (3d ed. 2007)) (citing 2 KENNETH S. BROUN, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 253, at 176 (6th
ed. 2006); 5 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE

§ 804.03[7][b], at 804-25 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2012)).
22. United States v. Ashley, 606 F.3d 135, 142-43 (4th Cir. 2010).
23. 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
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exist where "the substantive offense committed by one of the conspirators was
not in fact done in furtherance of the conspiracy, did not fall within the scope of
the unlawful project, or was merely a part of the ramifications of the plan which
could not be reasonably foreseen as a necessary or natural consequence of the
unlawful agreement."
The Fourth Circuit has explained that the principle
underlying Pinkerton "is that conspirators are each other's agents; and a
principal is bound by the acts of his agents within the scope of the agency." 25
D. The Cherry Doctrine
Eight years before the Giles decision, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit held that a criminal defendant waives his Confrontation Clause
rights and objections to the hearsay statements of an unavailable witness "if a
preponderance of the evidence establishes one of the following circumstances:
(1) he or she participated directly in planning or procuring the declarant's
unavailability through wrongdoing; or (2) the wrongful procurement was in
furtherance, within the scope, and reasonably foreseeable as a necessary or
natural consequence of an ongoing conspiracy."26 In reaching this holding, the
Tenth Circuit in United States v. Cherryn applied "the principles of
conspiratorial liability enunciated in Pinkerton v. United States in the context of
Rule 804(b)(6) and the Confrontation Clause waiver-by-misconduct doctrine." 28
Cherry asserted that "Pinkerton'sformulation of conspiratorial liability is an
appropriate mechanism for assessing whether the actions of another can be
imputed to a defendant for purposes of determining whether that defendant has
waived confrontation and hearsay objections."29 The Tenth Circuit elaborated,
"Failure to consider Pinkerton conspiratorial responsibility affords too much
weight to Confrontation Clause values in balancing those values against the
importance of preventing witness tampering."3o Cherry concluded that a "co-

24. Id. at 647-48.
25. United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1379 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v.
Manzella. 791 F.2d 1263. 1267 (7th Cir. 1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
26. United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 820 (10th Cir. 2000).
27. 217 F.3d 811.
28. Id. at 816 (citation omitted). The Tenth Circuit noted several lower federal court
decisions that "addressed more generally the applicability of imputed agency" in the forfeiture-bywrongdoing context. See id. at 818-20 (citing United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1279, 1280
(1st Cir. 1996): United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269. 273-74 (2d Cir. 1982); Olson v. Green,
668 F.2d 421. 429 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v. White, 838 F. Supp. 618, 623 (D.D.C. 1993).
af'd, 116 F.3d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). For example, in United States v. Mastrangelo, the court
noted that "[b]are knowledge" of a plot to kill a witness and a failure to give warning to authorities
may be sufficient to constitute waiver." Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 273-74. But see White. 838 F.
Supp. at 623 (instructing that "mere failure to prevent the [witness's] murder, or mere participation
in the alleged drug conspiracy at the heart of the case, must surely be insufficient to constitute a
waiver of a defendant's constitutional confrontation rights").
29. Cherry, 217 F.3d at 818.
30. Id. at 820.
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conspirator may be deemed to have 'acquiesced in' the wrongful procurement of
a witness's unavailability for purposes of Rule 804(b)(6) and the waiver by
misconduct doctrine when the government can satisfy the requirements of
Pinkerton."31
Notably, although "prosecutors can rely on the Cherry doctrine to admit a
witness's testimony, they may choose not to charge the defendant using
Pinkerton liability for the substantive offense that made the witness
unavailable."3' To a certain extent, the Cherry doctrine seemingly "pressed the
envelope of the forfeiture doctrine by imputing witness tampering to the accused
on the basis of the Pinkerton doctrine, holding cons irators complicit in
foreseeable but unplanned crimes by their confederates."
Nonetheless, other
courts subsequently adopted the Cherry analysis.34 Importantly, however, some
observers concluded that the 2008 Giles decision voided the Cherry doctrine "in
cases involving conspiracies where the defendant did not intend the witness
tampering."

111. 2012 FOURTH CIRCUIT DECISION IN UITED

STATES

v. DINKLS

United States v. Dinkins centered around three defendants: Melvin Gilbert
led a large-scale narcotics trafficking organization in Baltimore known as
"Special"; James Dinkins was Special's "enforcer"; and Darron Goods sold
drugs for Special. At some point, Gilbert learned that Shannon Jemmison, who
lived in the neighborhood, was a government informant. 3 On September 10,
2005, in exchange for several thousand dollars, Dinkins "shot Jemmison several
times at point-blank range, killing him."
Meanwhile, John Dowery, a Special drug dealer, had witnessed an unrelated
murder.39 Dowery provided information to law enforcement about both the
murder and about the Special organization. 40 As a result of Dowery's
information, two "high-ranking" Special "lieutenants" were arrested.41 Dowery
consequently became known as a "snitch."
On October 19, 2005, Dinkins and

31. Id. (citing Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1946)).
32. Rose, supra note 5, at 300.
33. Donald A. Dripps, Controlling the Damage Done by Crawford v. Washington: Dhree
Constructive Proposals, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 521. 537 (2010).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950. 964. 965 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting
agreement "with the reasoning of the majority in Cherrv" and holding that "waiver-by-misconduct
of one conspirator may be imputed to another conspirator if the misconduct was within the scope
and in furtherance of the conspiracy, and was reasonably foreseeable to him").
35. Rose, supra note 5, at 318.
36. See United States v. Dinkins, 691 F.3d 358, 362-63 (4th Cir. 2012).
37. See id. at 363-64.
38. Id. at 364.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 363. 364.
42. Id. at 364.
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another Special member shot Dowery multiple times.43 When Dinkins learned
that Dowery had not died from his wounds, Dinkins remarked,
"We have to F
to the hospital to finish him off."44 Dinkins did not pursue this plan, however.
After the attempted murder of Dowery, Dinkins killed Special member
Michael Bryant because, in part, Bryant was upset that Dinkins had attempted to
kill Dowery. 46 Dinkins was finally arrested on December 9, 2005.4
In January 2006, Dowery testified at the state trial of the lieutenants.48 Law
enforcement made efforts to protect Dowery, relocating him for his safety.49 At
some point, Gilbert relayed a message to Dowery: "I know where you are at. I
know where you walk your girl to the bus stop. I can get you out there. Don't
come around here."5 Nevertheless, Dowery returned to his previous home on
Thanksgiving Day 2006.5 Gilbert and Goods shot Dowery several times, killing
him52
A federal grand jury charged Dinkins, Gilbert, and Goods, as well as other
defendants, in a twelve-count indictment; the main count of the indictment was
the charge of conspiracy to distribute narcotics.5 Dinkins and Gilbert were also
charged with the murder of Jemmison. 54 Dinkins was charged in connection
with the attempted murder of Dowery and with the murder of Bryant . Gilbert
and Goods were charged with the murder of Dowery.56
The three defendants were tried jointly in the United States District Court for
the District of Maryland. At trial, the government presented Dowery's hearsay
statements to law enforcement pursuant to the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing
exception.
Dowery's hearsay statements were "highly relevant to the
government's theory of the case."
Importantly, the government presented
Dowery's hearsay statements as evidence against Dinkins pursuant to Rule
60
804(b)(6).

43. Id
44. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
45. Id n.3.
46. Id at 364-65.
47. Id. at 365.
48. See id.
49. Id
50. Id (internal quotation marks omitted).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(I), (b)(1)(B), (b)(1)(C), 846 (2006)).
54. Id. at 366 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2. 1512(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(C) (2006)).
55. Id. (citing §§ 2, 924(c)(1)(A)(iii)).
56. Id (citing §§ 2, 1512(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(C)).
57. See id. at 358-59, 362.
58. See id. at 367, 382.
59. Id. at 382. Dowery's statements included: (1) a description of Special's members and
structure; (2) an identification of Dinkins as one of the shooters from the October 2005 attempted
murder; and (3) the threatening message that Dowery had received from Gilbert after witnessrelocation measures. See id.
60. Id.
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Dinkins, Gilbert, and Goods were convicted and sentenced to life
imprisonment.61 On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, Dinkins argued that the district court "erred by admitting Dowery's
hearsay statements into evidence."62 In particular, Dinkins contended that the
forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception was inapplicable to Dowerv's hearsay
statements regarding Dinkins' acts because Dinkins was uninvolved in any
63
wrongdoing that caused Dowery's death. Dinkins asserted that by the time of
Dowery's murder in November 2006, Dinkins had already been imprisoned for
nearly a year, "and no evidence was presented to show that he participated in the
murder." 6 4
By contrast, the government argued that the statements were "admissible
under the principles of conspiratorial liability" that the Supreme Court outlined
in Pinkerton v. United States.65 The government contended that Dinkins'
incarceration when his co-conspirator gang members "eliminated Dowery as a
witness, a task Dinkins initiated when he originally shot Dowery in 2005, did not
entitle Dinkins to escape responsibility for Dinkins' acts of attempting to prevent
Dowery from testifying."6 6
In response, the Fourth Circuit noted that it had "not yet considered the
question whether hearsay statements may be admitted under the forfeiture-bywrongdoing exception pursuant to a conspiracy theory of liability, when a
defendant's co-conspirators engaged in the wrongdoing that ultimately rendered
the declarant unavailable as a witness."6 The Dinkins court concluded that
"traditional principles of conspiracy liability are applicable within the forfeitureby-wrongdoing analysis." 68 Thus, the Fourth Circuit held "that the district court
properly admitted the Dowery hearsay statements against Dinkins under the
forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception to the Confrontation Clause pursuant to
Pinkertonprinciples of conspiratorial liability."69
The Dinkins court reasoned that the "language of Rule 804(b)(6) supports
the application of Pinkerton principles of conspiratorial liability in the forfeitureby-wrongdoing context, by requiring that the defendant either have 'wrongfully
caused-or
acquiesced
in
wrongfully
causing-the
declarant's
unavailability."70 To that extent, Dinkins cited the reasoning of the Tenth

61. Id at 367.
62. Id. at 381-82. Gilbert also challenged on appeal the admissibility of the statements; yet,
his claim did not implicate the Cherry doctrine. See id. at 386.
63. Id at 383-84.
64. Id at 384.
65. Id. (citing Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1946)).
66. Id.
67. Id
68. Id
69. Id. at 386.
70. Id. at 384 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6)).
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Circuit in Cherry.' Dinkins stated, "We are persuaded by [Cherry's] reasoning
that application of principles of conspiratorial liability in the forfeiture-bywrongdoing context strikes the appropriate balance between the competing
interests" of "Confrontation Clause values" and "the importance of preventing
witness tampering."
Dinkins instructed, "Mere participation in a conspiracy will not trigger the
admission of testimonial statements under a forfeiture-by-wrongdoing theory."n
Instead, a defendant waives "his Confrontation Clause rights when (1) the
defendant participated directly in planning or procuring the declarant's
unavailability through wrongdoing; or (2) the wrongful procurement was in
furtherance, within the scope, and reasonably foreseeable as a necessary or
-74
natural consequence of an ongoing conspiracy."
Critically, however, the Fourth Circuit addressed the implications of Giles
on the Cherry doctrine.
The Dinkins court acknowledged that Giles clarified
that the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception applies "only when the defendant
engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness from testifying."76 Dinkins
thus explained that although the "proper application of Pinkerton liability
standards in the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing context generally will be coextensive
with the scope of forfeiture by wrongdoing as articulated in Giles, a court's
decision under the second prong in Cherry must be supported by evidence that
the defendant 'engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness from
testifying.'"n
Analyzing the facts surrounding Dinkins' involvement in Dowery's
"unavailability," the Fourth Circuit concluded that Dowery's murder "was in
furtherance, within the scope, and reasonably foreseeable as a natural
consequence of an ongoing conspiracy of which Dinkins was a member.",7 The
Dinkins court observed, "Dowery's murder certainly was reasonably foreseeable
to Dinkins, in view of the fact that he and [a] co-conspirator ... nearly had

71. See id. at 384-85 (citing Giles v. California. 554 U.S. 353, 359 (2008); United States v.
Gray, 405 F.3d 227, 242 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Cherry. 217 F.3d 811, 820 (10th Cir.
2000)) (noting that its "conclusion is supported by decisions of our sister circuits applying
principles of conspiratorial liability in this context").
72. Id. at 385 (quoting Cherry, 217 F.3d at 820) (internal quotation marks omitted).
73. Id.
74. Id. (citing Cherry, 217 F.3d at 820).
75. See id. at 383. 385 (citing Giles, 554 U.S. at 359).
76. Id. at 383 (quoting Giles, 554 U.S. at 359) (internal quotation marks omitted).
77. Id at 385 (quoting Giles, 554 U.S. at 359). Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit concluded
that Giles "did not materially alter application of the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception." Id. at
383. Dinkins elaborated that "the plain language of Rule 804(b)(6) imposes this evidentiary
requirement"; furthermore, Dinkins noted that even before the Giles decision, the Fourth Circuit had
"4upheld the admission of evidence under a theory of forfeiture by wrongdoing only when the
government has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's wrongdoing 'was
intended to render the declarant unavailable as a witness."' Id. (quoting Gray, 405 F.3d at 241).
78. Id. at 385.
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succeeded in murdering Dowery the year before . . . ."'9 The Fourth Circuit

added, "Dinkins' acts of wrongdoing, as well as those of his co-conspirators,
were intended to prevent, and in fact did prevent, Dowery from testifying."80
IV.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DINKas DECISION

Although Dinkins ostensibly concluded that the Cherry doctrine had
survived Giles,8 as a practical matter, the Fourth Circuit fundamentally
restricted the scope of the Cherry doctrine. Giles's critical intent requirement
largely compelled this result.8 The Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Dinkins is
particularly significant in that Dinkins is the first federal circuit court decision to
substantively discuss whether the Cherry doctrine has remained viable after the
2008 Giles decision.3
As one scholar has aptly noted, the Cherry doctrine "signal[s] a willingness
to transfer the requisite Giles intent from one defendant to another."8 4 The
Fourth Circuit decision in Dinkins correctly recognized that Giles mandated that
hearsay is inadmissible under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception unless the
government demonstrates that the defendant possessed the intent to render the
witness unavailable.85 Thus, under Dinkins, even where the Cherry doctrine is
applicable, courts may not "transfer the requisite Giles intent from one defendant
to another" as the Cherry doctrine might suggest. 6
The Fourth Circuit instructed in Dinkins that a witness waives his
confrontation rights when "(1) [h]e participated directly in planning or procuring
the declarant's unavailability through wrongdoing; or (2) the wrongful
procurement was in furtherance, within the scope, and reasonably foreseeable as
a necessary or natural consequence of an ongoing conspiracy. 8 Importantly,
however, consistent with Giles, the Dinkins court cautioned that where a court
admits hearsay under this second scenario, the court's decision "must be
supported by evidence that the defendant 'engaged in conduct designed to
prevent the witness from testifying.'"

79. Id. at 386.
80. Id. Dinkins also noted, "[I]n view of other evidence ... establishing a pattern of
intimidation and violence with respect to governent informants by members of Special, we
consider that Dowery's ultimate murder was a natural consequence of the ongoing conspiracy." Id.
81. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
82. See Dinkins, 691 F.3d at 385-86 (quoting Giles, 554 U.S. at 359).
83.

See supra note 5.

84. Marc McAllister, Down But Not Out: 47 Giles Leaves Foufeiture by Wrongdoing Still
Standing, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 393, 434 (2009).
85. See Dinkins, 691 F.3d at 385-86 (quoting Giles, 554 U.S. at 359).
86. See McAllister, supra note 84, at 434.
87. Dinkins, 691 F.3d at 385 (citing United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811 , 820 (10th Cir.
2000)).
88. Id. (quoting Giles, 554 U.S. at 359).
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To that extent, Dinkins indicated that a defendant does not waive his
confrontation rights where the witness's unavailability was "within the scope,
and reasonably foreseeable as a necessary or natural consequence of an ongoing
conspiracy" 89 but there is no evidence that the defendant "engaged in conduct
designed to prevent the witness from testifying."9o Therefore, Dinkins attempted
to comport the Cherry doctrine with the Giles requirement of intent. As the
Dinkins decision suggests, Giles's crucial focus on intent must remain a
touchstone of a court's analysis where the government seeks to admit an
unavailable witness's hearsay pursuant to the Cherry doctrine.
As an illustration, the facts in Dinkins amply supported the conclusion that
Dinkins had intended to prevent Dow ery from testifying and that he engaged in
conduct in furtherance of this intent.91 As the Fourth Circuit noted, "Dowery's
murder certainly was reasonably foreseeable to Dinkins, in view of the fact that
he and [a] co-conspirator ... nearly had succeeded in murdering Dowery the
year before ... 92 Thus, although Dinkins was incarcerated at the time of
Dowery's murder,93 his actions clearly demonstrated that he intended to prevent
Dowery from testifying and that he had engaged in some conduct in furtherance
of this intent.
Yet, suppose that Dinkins had never attempted to murder or intimidate
Dowery; in fact, Dinkins had never expressed any animosity towards Dowery.
In this hypothetical scenario, the Fourth Circuit's conclusion concerning the
admissibility of Dowery's hearsay statements as evidence against Dinkins would
have conceivably been quite different. The government would likely have been
unable to demonstrate that Dinkins (1) intended for his co-conspirator to render
Dowery unavailable and (2) had engaged in some conduct in furtherance of this
intent.
As one scholar has cogently observed, "There is a need for some proportion
between the individual's act and its consequences, so there must be some proof
of individual knowledge. approval, or participation in the intimidation to avoid
an unfair result." 94 Consequently. pursuant to Giles, the mere reasonable
foreseeability of Dowery's murder to Dinkins, by itself, would not have justified
the admission of hearsay tinder the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception.
Furthermore, the Dinkins court asserted that the "language of Rule 804(b)(6)
supports the application of Pinkerton principles of conspiratorial liability in the
forfeiture-by-wrongdoing context, by requiring that the defendant either have
'wrongfully caused-or acquiesced in wrongfully causing-the declarant's

89. Id
90. Id (quoting Giles, 554 U.S. at 359) (internal quotation marks omitted).
91. See id. at 3 86.
92. Id.
93. See id at 384.
94. James F. Flanagan, Forfeiture by Trongdoing and flhose Who Acquiesce in fWitness
Intimidation: A Reach Exceeding Its Grasp and Other Problems with Federal Rule of Evidence
804(b)(6), 51 DRAIE L. REV. 459, 518 (2003).
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unavailability."9 Yet, as Giles makes clear, such acquiescence cannot justify
the admission of hearsay under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception without
a demonstrated intent and some action in furtherance of that intent.
Critically, the fundamental purpose of Rule 806(b)(4) is to prevent the
"abhorrent behavior" of rendering witnesses unavailable "which strikes at the
heart of the system of justice itself."96 Problematically, however, the pre-Giles
formulation of the Cherry doctrine, overly broad in scope, improperly deprived a
defendant of his fundamental confrontation rights merely because one of his coconspirators had secured a witness's absence in order to prevent the witness's
testimony.97 The Supreme Court in Giles clearly mandated that the forfeitureby-wrongdoing exception should penalize only those individuals who secure the
absence of a witness with the intent to render the witness "unavailable."9 To
that extent, if the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception is to be a meaningful
sanction for those who engage in the "abhorrent behavior" of witness tampering,
it should not penalize a conspirator uninvolved in his co-conspirator's witness
tampering.
Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit in Dinkins concluded that the Cherry doctrine
has remained viable post-Giles.99 At the same time, however, the Dinkins court
adeptly reconciled the Cherry doctrine with the fundamental intent requirement
of Giles. 100 As the Fourth Circuit acknowledged in Dinkins, "application of
principles of conspiratorial liability in the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing context"
must balance the competing interests of "Confrontation Clause values" and
"preventing witness tampering." 101 The Fourth Circuit's reasoning, which
effectively balanced these competing interests, provides much-needed guidance
for other courts that must confront the proper scope of the Cherry doctrine postGiles.

95. Dinkins, 691 F.3d at 384 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6)).
96. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) advisory committee's note to 1997 amendment (quoting United
States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. See Dripps, supra note 33, at 537.
98. See Giles v. California. 554 U.S. 353, 359 (2008).
99. See Dinkins, 691 F.3d at 384 85 (quoting Giles, 554 U.S. at 359; United States v. Cherry
217 F.3d 811, 820 (1Oth Cir. 2000)).
100. See id. (quoting Giles, 554 U.S. at 359; Cherry, 217 F.3d at 820).
101. Id. at 385 (quoting Cherry, 217 F.3d at 820) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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